The one-party South is considered the canonical example of democracy's impossibility in the absence of partisan competition. I argue that this view conflates the effects of disfranchisement and one-partyism. Despite the lack of partisan competition, Democratic primaries induced a "selectoral connection" between Southern members of Congress and the (white) eligible electorate. Using survey and roll-call data from the 1930s-50s, I show that Southern whites were collectively well represented in Congress. Southern MCs' transformation from New Dealers to centrists mirrored analogous shifts in the white public. Cross-sectionally, Southern senators were just as responsive to their electorates' economic policy preferences as non-Southern senators. Data on income differences across electorates indicate that Southern representatives were responsive too, though less so than senators. In addition to illuminating a pivotal period in American political, these findings suggest that partisan competition is not necessary for effective representation.
Introduction
Democracy is widely considered to require partisan competition. Among political scientists, support for E. E. Schattschneider's famous claim that that "democracy is unthinkable" without parties is as close to unanimous as the discipline gets.
1
Some works, such as Alvarez et al. (1996) , go so far as to incorporate partisan competition into their very definition of democracy. But even scholars who consider the two concepts logically separable believe that, empirically, "partisan competition is a necessary precondition for democracy" (Aldrich and Griffin 2010, 595; see also American Political Science Association 1950; Lipset 1996; Katz 2006; Aldrich 2011) .
Most arguments for democracy's dependence on party competition hinge on parties' role in providing information to citizens.
2 In this view, the structure and continuity provided by party labels enable voters to make informed choices between competing candidates and to hold incumbents accountable for their behavior in office (Downs 1957; Snyder and Ting 2002; Wright and Schaffner 2002; Aldrich and Griffin 2010) . Without these aids to prospective choice and retrospective accountability, citizens cannot induce governments to be responsive to their preferences.
3
Since representation is a key characteristic of and justification for democracy (Mill 1867; Dahl 1971; Sen 1999) , lack of partisan competition thus is fatal to democracy, or at least to a well-functioning one. My goal here is to dispute the notion that electoral competition between partyaffiliated candidates is necessary for representation. I further argue that under certain institutional conditions, nonpartisan elections are just as effective at promoting 1. "No theorist we know of," write Wright and Schaffner (2002, 367) , "has. . . explicitly challenged Schattschneider's . . . proposition."
2. Other arguments focus on the danger that office holders, once elected, will attempt to stay in office unconstitutionally or otherwise tyrannize their subjects. In this view, parties' ambition for office serves as an essential check on incumbents' authoritarian tendencies, especially in weakly consolidated democracies (see, e.g., Levitsky and Cameron 2003, on Peru under Fujimori) . Without parties, the logic goes, opposition to power-hungry incumbents will be fragmented and susceptible to cooptation. See also Ferejohn (1986) on collusion between incumbents and challenges in one-party states.
3. Snyder and Ting (2003) provide the most compelling formalization of the argument that lack of information inhibits representation. They show that increases in the probability that voters observe representatives' behavior in office leads to greater median convergence and a stronger correlation with constituency preferences on the part of representatives.
4. I use representation in the sense described by Pitkin (1967, 209) : "acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them." This is roughly equivalent to what Dahl and others mean by the term responsiveness. As I discuss below, however, I reserve the latter term for a specific empirical measure of representation: the expected difference in representatives' behavior associated with a one-unit difference in constituency preferences (Achen 1978) .
representation as partisan elections. To support this argument, I re-examine the canonical example of the pathologies of one-party politics: the American South in the early to mid-20th century (Key 1949).
5
Focusing on congressional politics between the 1930s and early 1960s, I argue that electoral competition in Democratic primaries created a "selectoral connection" for Southern members of Congress (MCs), inducing them to represent the (white) eligible electorate. I show empirically that Southern senators and representatives, typically considered to have represented only the economic elite, were in fact broadly in step with the evolving policy preferences of Southern white public as a whole. In addition, Southern senators were no less responsive to their white constituents than were Northern senators to their constituents.
My explanation for these surprising results invokes several features of the larger institutional context. First, although Southern MCs did not face partisan competition, they still operated in a partisan environment once in Congress. Southern MCs were forced to take positions in the low-dimensional space of national politics, giving voters better information about their ideological positions than would have been the case had Congress not been organized along partisan lines (cf. Wright and Schaffner 2002) . National partisan divisions also trickled down into Southern primary campaigns, leading candidates to mimic the ideological positions taken by Democrats and Republicans elsewhere. Finally, representation was enhanced by the relatively high salience and competitiveness of Southern primaries. Consistent with this claim, Southern members of the House, whose primaries were somewhat less competitive than senators', appear to have been less responsive than both Southern senators and Northern House members.
These findings contribute to two major literatures. The first concerns the place of the South in American political development. In line with the view of the one-party South as a set of "authoritarian enclaves" (Gibson 2012; Mickey 2014) , scholars have typically portrayed Southern MCs as agents of the Southern plantation elite and as largely immune to popular pressures. Consequently, the large body of scholarship documenting Southern MCs' crucial role in structuring the American welfare state and political economy attributes their pivotal actions almost exclusively to the preferences of the Southern elite.
6 Although evidence of representation does not mean 5. As evidence for the one-party South's canonical status, consider the fact that one recent review of parties' role in democratic politics, Aldrich and Griffin (2010) , devotes three of its thirteen pages to the one-party South and discusses no other empirical examples (see also Aldrich 2011, 25-6, 310-12) .
6. See, for example, Katznelson, Geiger, and Kryder (1993) , Quadagno (1994) , Lieberman (1998) , Alston and Ferrie (1999) , Brown (1999) , Manza (2000) , Farhang and Katznelson (2005) , and Domhoff and Webber (2011) .
that the one-party South was a democracy, it does mean that our accounts of Southern MCs actions must be rooted at least partly in the preferences of their white constituents. Indeed, the possibilities for representation within the one-party system help explain whites' loyalty to-and thus the durability of-the South's authoritarian regime.
My findings also shed light on parties' place in democratic theory. First, they cast doubt the argument that because democracy requires representation and representation requires partisan competition, democracy requires partisan competition. There may be other reasons that democracy requires parties, but arguments that run through the mechanism of representation appear to be unsound. More generally, the evidence I present undermines the claim that partisan competition necessarily enhances representation. When elections are regularly contested and voters have access to low-cost information about candidates' positions, as was especially true of Senate primaries in the South, representation appears to work about as well as in partsan elections. However, when these conditions do not pertain, as was more fully the case in state and local politics in the one-party South, the conventional critique of one-party politics is much more likely to hold.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. I begin with an overview of Southern politics between the 1930s and the early 1960s, documenting Southern MCs' evolution from New Dealers to centrists as well as their persistent ideological diversity on questions of economics. I then describe the operation of Southern primaries, with an emphasis on how they induced Southern MCs to respond to the policy preferences of the eligible electorate. Following that, I present empirical evidence for congressional representation in the one-party South. I first examine Southern Democrats' collective congruence with the economic preferences of the Southern white public, and then compare the dyadic responsiveness of state congressional delegations in the North and South. The final empirical section analyzes responsiveness to the economic interests of the electorate, examining differences in Southern MCs' responsiveness between the House and Senate. The paper concludes with a discussion of my findings' implications for democratic theory and American political development.
The One-Party South, 1930s-60s
For the first half of the 20th century, until the Second Reconstruction of the 1960s, the eleven states of the former Confederacy were ruled by a set of exclusionary one-party enclaves (Gibson 2012; Mickey 2014) .
Scholars following in Key's wake have tended to adopt a more extreme and less nuanced version of his argument, which might be called an "elite dominance" perspective. This perspective is exemplified by the following quotation from Domhoff and Webber (2011, 59 ):
Complete planter dominance through the Democratic Party was solidified by the "white primary" system introduced early in the twentieth century. This system maintained one-party white dominance while at the same time providing a semblance of political choice and electoral competition, thereby allowing the dominant planter class to continue to profess its allegiance to democratic principles. . . . With all due allowance for the populist-oriented stem-winders within the Democratic Party, this was the party of the Southern white rich, at whose core stood the plantation capitalists.
Southern Democrats in Congress
Most studies of congressional politics in the one-party South adopt an elite dominance perspective, treating Southern MCs as agents of planters and other low-wage employers.
8 In this view, lack of electoral competition gave Southern MCs "few incentives to respond to whatever popular pressures did emerge" from the region's "shriveled, conservative electorate" (Manza 2000, 309) . As a consequence, Southern MCs, "free from the constraints of a conventional reelection imperative," instead represented the "the interests of its economic and political elites" (Farhang and Katznelson 2005, 6; Katznelson, Geiger, and Kryder 1993, 284) .
9
While some analyses reduce Southern MCs to a reactionary bloc (e.g., Hofstadter 1949), most careful scholars acknowledge the liberal and reformist impulses of the 8. Key (1949) devotes two chapters to a discussion of the South in Congress, in which he emphasizes their ideological diversity on questions other than race. He notes that urban congressional districts tended to send more liberal representatives to Congress, and that ideological differences between senators tended to reflect their factional affiliations. But otherwise he has little to say about the sources of ideological variation among Southern MCs or their representational linkages with voters.
9. Other works that more-or-less adopt an elite-dominance perspective on the one-party South include Bensel (1984) , Black and Black (1987, 2002) , Quadagno (1994) , Lieberman (1998) , Alston and Ferrie (1999), and Brown (1999) , and Domhoff and Webber (2011) . A particularly strong and direct statement of this view is given by Domhoff (1996, 3-4) , who stresses "the immediate, direct, and continuous role of large plantation owners in effecting federal policy through the Democratic party and Congress. . . . [T] he planters were often in Congress, representing themselves." 1931−1932 1933−1934 1935−1936 1937−1938 1939−1940 1941−1942 1943−1944 1945−1946 1947−1948 1949−1950 1951−1952 1953−1954 1955−1956 1957−1958 1959−1960 1961−1962 Deal, are used to estimate the model, so the ideal points can be interpreted as congress-specific measures of senators' opposition to New Deal liberalism.
11
Figure 1 highlights two important patterns in Congress (analogous plots for the U.S. House tell a similar story). The first is Southern Democrats' transformation from strong liberals in the 1930s to moderates by 1945-46 (79th Congress) . This made Southern MCs collectively the pivotal player in congressional politics, a position they maintained into the 1960s (Katznelson and Mulroy 2012) . But Figure 1 also illustrates the limitations of treating Southern Democrats as a collective actor, for they remained ideologically diverse even as they became more conservative. Precisely because the pivotal voter was so often a Southern Democrat, the exact ideological distribution within the Southern caucus usually determined the set of feasible policy outcomes.
The ideological diversity within the Southern caucus is sometimes acknowledged, but it is almost never explained. This is partly because most accounts either treat Southern MCs as ciphers for an undifferentiated elite, or else explain their diversity in terms of idiosyncratic variation in Southern MCs' personal policy preferences. Only a few works have rooted their explanations in the "electoral connection" so central to analyses of congressional behavior outside the one-party South (Mayhew 1974a) . Fewer still have attempted to measure the preferences of Southern electorates and examine their relationship with the behavior of Southern MCs. In order for Southern MCs to have responded to popular preferences, there had to have been a mechanism to induce them to do so. In democratic regimes, this 11. The ideal points were estimated using the dynamic Bayesian one-dimensional IRT model developed by Martin and Quinn (2002) and implemented in the R package MCMCpack (Martin, Quinn, and Park 2011). There are several reasons that I use these estimates rather than offthe-shelf estimates, such as first-dimension DW-NOMINATE scores (Poole and Rosenthal 2007) . First, I wish to restrict the analysis to bills related to New Deal liberalism, which I do by using only roll calls in the "Government Management" and "Social Welfare" issue categories developed by Clausen (1973) and included in data provided by Poole and Rosenthal (1998, 2001) . Second, publicly available DW-NOMINATE scores constrain ideal points to move linearly across congresses, which makes it difficult to detect rapid or non-monotonic ideological change. Third, estimating the model with MCMC simulation facilitates the calculation of uncertainty estimates for auxiliary quantities, such as the median in each congress (Clinton and Jackman 2009) . See Caughey and Schickler (2014) for further discussion of these issues.
12. Three partial exceptions are Flinn and Wolman (1966) , Mayhew (1966), and Fleck (2002) , who proxy for the electorate's in various ways. mechanism is elections, which (potentially) allow voters to select representative candidates and sanction unrepresentative incumbents (Fearon 1999) . The combination of prospective selection and retrospective accountability tends to align office-holders incentives with the preferences of their electorates. Given the lack of competition in general elections, Democratic primaries are the only plausible candidate for such a mechanism. Were they up to the task? That is, did they provide primary voters with meaningful and identifiable alternatives, and were incumbents held electorally accountable once in office?
In this section, I present evidence that Democratic primaries did indeed create a "selectoral connection" between MCs and voters, providing incentives for the former to be responsive to the latter.
13 After first showing that the electorate extended well beyond the economic elite, I demonstrate that competition in Democratic primaries was frequent and often presented voters with clear ideological choices. Finally, I discuss the evidence for responsiveness in Southern primaries, showing that ideological turnover among Southern MCs often corresponded to changes in voters' policy preferences.
Participation
Following Dahl (1971), we can distinguish between two dimensions of democracy: inclusiveness (the scope of political participation) and contestation (the extent of permissible political competition). The one-party South exhibited limitations on both of these dimensions. Most blatantly, suffrage restrictions excluded many whites and nearly all blacks from political participation (Kousser 1974; Alt 1994) . For its part, lack of partisan competition was maintained not only by the Democratic loyalties of enfranchised whites, but also by a variety of legal and extralegal mechanisms that raised the costs of partisan opposition (Mickey 2008, 149; see also Valelly 2004 on the barriers to party-building in South).
Distinguishing inclusiveness from contestation is essential to identifying the consequences of lack of party competition per se. All works that have used the case of the one-party South to argue that party competition is necessary in democratic regimes have relied on the assumption that it is possible to separate the effects of one-partyism from those of disenfranchisement. The central link in this line of reasoning is the claim that lack of party competition denied representation even to the enfranchised population.
One way the elite-dominance perspective could be reconciled with representation of the eligible electorate is if political participation was so restricted that only the economic elite were included. If this was so, the selectorate of the one-party South was so small as to be oligarchical. Moreover, such a small set of principals must have be able to monitor representatives very closely, inducing a close agency relationship and a high degree of representation elite preferences (cf. Gailmard and Jenkins 2009). Data on voter turnout, however, suggest that the electorate extended well beyond the economic elite. In presidential elections between 1932 and 1948, turnout in the South averaged about 25% of the voting-age population (VAP); in 1952-60, the figure was almost 40%.
14 As a point of comparison, presidential turnout in the South rose to a peak of 50% immediately after the 1965 Voting Rights Act and remained roughly at that level though the end of the century (McDonald and Popkin 2001, 969, Table  3 ). Over the 1932-60 period, the number of presidential voters in Southern general elections ranged between one-third and one-half of the white population.
15
The congressional primary electorate was usually but not always a bit smaller than the presidential electorate. Turnout in contested House and Senate primaries averaged 17-23% of VAP in years before 1945 and 24-27% afterwards.
16 Since primary turnout depended on election-specific conditions, presidential turnout is probably a more accurate (though still conservative) measure of the eligible primary electorate.
17
White turnout, which was depressed by apathy (Ewing 1953, 3-4) and free-riding (Alt 1994, 359) as well as by suffrage restrictions, was inherently more elastic than turnout among blacks, for whom suffrage barriers were almost insuperable.
Competition
A core attribute of political parties is that they contest elections in an effort to gain control of government. Effective representation may not require that elections be competitive in equilibrium, 18 but without the potential for competition, "the right 14. Calculated from county-level demographic data from the U.S. Census and electoral data from Leip (2013) .
15. African Americans, who constituted about a quarter of the South's population, were almost completely disenfranchised until 1944, and they remained a small presence in Southern elections until after 1965 (Bartley 1995, 172) .
16. Calculated from data provided by James Snyder on behalf of his collaborators (Ansolabehere et al. 2010) .
17. The eligible electorate is a more relevant quantity than the actual number of voters because politicians tend to act in light of the anticipated response of potentially mobilizable constituencies (Arnold 1990) .
18. For example, in Besley and Coate's (1997) "citizen-candidate" model of representative democracy, the policy outcome in an equilibrium in which only a single candidate runs for office is always the ideal point of the median voter (given a one-dimensional policy space).
to 'participate' is stripped of a very large part of [its] significance" (Dahl 1971, 5) . Did Democratic congressional primaries compensate for the almost total lack of competition in Southern general elections?
19
To a substantial degree they did (Ansolabehere et al. 2010) . Over the 1932-60 period, 45% of Democratic House nominations and 56% of Senate nominations were contested. Primary competition declined a bit in the 1950s, but primaries remained at least as important as general elections as sites of political competition. Over 30% of Southern members of Congress experienced at least two contested primary victories over their career. Even Sam Rayburn of Texas, the powerful and longserving Speaker of the House, rarely saw an election year pass without a primary challenge (Hardeman and Bacon 1987) .
Primary opposition was not just perfunctory. About 19% of contested congressional primaries were decided by a margin less than 10 percentage points, and 36% were decided by less than 20 points.
20 Incumbents running for reelection were defeated in 7% of all Southern primaries in the 1930s, 3.5% in the 1940s, and 2% in the 1950s-incumbent defeat rates comparable to many contemporary House elections (Ansolabehere et al. 2010, 197) . In the Senate, the incumbent defeat rate was much higher, closer to 30%: between 1920 and 1954, 18 Southern senators were defeated for renomination.
21
Was this competition meaningful? That is, was is structured along ideological lines that were inelligible to most voters? Many scholars have emphasized that in the absence of party labels, Southern primary campaigns often revolved around other salient characteristics of the candidates, such as a flamboyant personality. But primary candidates also frequently took ideologically opposing positions. As Key (1964, 441) observes, Southern congressional primaries in this period "tend[ed] to take on the tone of contests between Democrats and Republicans elsewhere." As it did in 19. General elections in the one-party South tended to be sleepy affairs in which the Democratic nominee cruised to victory. Even as Republicans made inroads at the presidential level in the 1950s, competing for lower-level offices in the South far more daunting, given that the party totally lacked experienced candidates or an institutional base in the region (Black and Black 2002) . Notwithstanding Republican takeovers of a few isolated congressional districts, over three-quarters of Democratic House candidates between 1950 and 1960 won office with more than 80% of the vote. Through the 1960 election, Democrats continued to compose well over 90% of Southern House members and 100% of Southern senators.
20. When elections that were uncontested or for which data are missing are included in the denominator, the percentages fall to 8% and 17%, respectively. As a point of comparison, in the 35 years after the 1974 publication of David Mayhew's famous "vanishing marginals" article, about 15% of non-Southern House elections were decided by less than 10 points. (AR, 1954) , and Yarborough vs. Blakley (TX, 1958) , all of which pitted a New Deal liberal against a substantially more conservative opponent. Campaign appeals, media coverage, and interest-group endorsements helped convey this information to voters, who also could also rely on heuristics such as a candidate's hometown. 
Responsiveness
Congressional candidates may have taken ideologically opposed positions, but did voters have enough information to perceive differences between candidates and make ideological choices? Grynaviski (2004) provides evidence that Southern primary voters were able to coordinate on the optimal number of viable candidates, especially in higher-salience contexts, such when an incumbent was running for reelection. More direct evidence for ideological accountability in Southern primaries is provided by the numerous examples of Southern MCs denied renomination when the preferences of the electorate changed.
Such preference shifts occurred for two reasons. One was the mobilization of new constituencies into the electorate. In 1948, for example, CIO-backed Henderson Lanham mobilized newly unionized textile workers and unseated anti-labor Georgia congressman Malcom Tarver (Brattain 1997) .
23 Returning WWII veterans played a similar role in the 1948 Tennessee Senate primary, helping the liberal Estes Kefauver defeat Memphis machine boss E. H. Crump (Cobb 2010, 67) .
24
More commonly, shifts in the ideological mood of the Southern public led to turnover in the region's congressional delegations. "In a period of conservatism," noted one contemporary observer, "the one-party South responds by electing conservative Democrats while the farm belt responds by electing reactionary Republicans" (Carleton 1951, 226 (Weiss 1971; Sweeney 1999) .
25 Many of these liberals had been swept into office in the early to mid-1930s, a period of liberal ascendency when a number of anti-New Deal incumbents were defeated by more liberal challengers.
26
The threat of such challenges prompted an ancipatory response from incumbents. Some responded by retiring pre-emptively from office. Coode (1971, 19) describes the 1936 retirement decision of Bryant Castellow, a conservative House member from Georgia, as follows:
[T]ired of public office, weary of facing a campaign against a serious contender he had defeated by only 2,000 votes two years before, apparently having lost whatever earlier enthusiasm his voting record suggest that he had for the New Deal, and unable to stop the march of the new order, Castellow declined to run for re-election.
Pro-labor North Carolina Representative John Folger made the same decision after squeaking out renomination in 1946.
27 Many other incumbents responded to shifting ideological winds by adapting their roll-call voting. Indeed, contrary to the conventional finding that ideological change in Congress occurs overwhelmingly through replacement (Poole and Rosenthal 2007; but see Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995) , adaptation was at least as important as replacement as a mechanism for Southern MCs ideological migration in this period.
28
25. 1938 was also the year of FDR's failed "purge" of conservative Democrats, most of them Southern (Dunn 2010).
26. In 1934, for example, Senator Hubert Stephens of Mississippi, a lukewarm supporter of the early New Deal, tried in vain to tie himself to Roosevelt but was defeated for renomination by the populist Theodore Bilbo-the sort of challenge on the left that kept otherwise wary Southerners loyal to FDR (Morgan 1985, 64; Swain 2001) . One senator who did not heed the signs of this defeat was Oklahoma's Senator Thomas Gore, a long-time incumbent and one of the most outspoken opponents of the New Deal, who was overwhelmingly defeated in the 1936 Democratic primary in (Patterson 1967, 22-4; Dangerfield and Flynn 1936) .
27. Taking his near-defeat as a sign of increased conservatism in his district, Folger retired and was succeeded by his more conservative challenger from two years previous (Christian 1976) .
28. In most congresses, the average difference between exiting and entering members of the Southern caucus was about as large as the the inter-congress differences among continuing members. Since there were many more of the latter, adaptation accounts for a much larger share of Southern Democrats' ideological change between congresses.
In short, primary competition was far from universal, but it was common enough to pose a genuine threat to Southern MCs, and competition did not have to be observed to be effective. Further, while candidates typically (though not always) ran individualized campaigns rather than affiliating with a coherent faction, the conduct and outcomes of primary campaigns was not simply random. Rather, they often reflected shifts in public mood or the mobilization of new constituencies.
Statistical Evidence for Representation
Democratic primaries appear to have created a selectoral connection between Southern MCs and the eligible electorate, but did this connection result in meaningful representation? That is, did MCs act in the interests of their voting constituents, in a manner responsive to their expressed preferences (Pitkin 1967, 209) ? This section explores this question from several angles, beginning with an examination of public preferences towards New Deal liberalism.
New Deal Liberalism in the Public
Evaluating the representativeness of Southern MCs first requires measures of the preferences of their constituents. To construct such measures, we rely on commercial public-opinion polls fielded between 1936 and 1952. 29 In these years, George Gallup, Elmo Roper, and other pollsters fielded hundreds of polls that collectively surveyed over one million Americans. These polls included hundreds of policy-related questions, most of them on the issues of economic regulation and social welfare raised by the New Deal and Fair Deal.
30 These polls thus provide the raw material for 29. Only recently have these data become easily accessible to researchers, thanks to a team led by Adam Berinsky, Eric Schickler, and Jasjeet Sekhon, who cleaned, standardized, and weighted the poll samples. 30. The abundance of left-right domestic-policy questions from the 1936-52 period stands in sharp contrast to the dearth of such questions included in surveys conducted between 1952 and the early 1960s (Erskine 1964) . It is difficult to say whether pollsters' declining interest in questions separating liberals and conservatives is more a cause or a consequence of the relatively consensual, non-polarized politics of the 1950s. a measure of public support for New Deal liberalism analogous to the ideal-point estimates for MCs presented earlier.
Despite this wealth of information on public opinion, constructing a mass-level measure of New Deal liberalism presents three challenges. First, because respondents were selected using quota sampling rather than probability sampling, the poll samples are not representative of the American public (Berinsky 2006) . Second, though the poll samples are comparatively large (2,000-3,000 respondents), they are still not large enough for reliable estimation of subnational opinion below the regional level. Third, because each poll rarely included more than a couple of policy questions, idealpoint techniques such as IRT models cannot be applied to individual respondents.
Previous works have dealt with these problems by weighting each poll to match regional population targets, which alleviates the sampling bias, and then analyzing the weighted poll-specific question marginals (e.g., Berinsky 2009; Schickler and Caughey 2011). An alternative approach, better suited to our purposes, is the Bayesian grouplevel IRT model developed by Caughey and Warshaw (2013) . In essence, their model estimates the average (latent) liberalism in groups defined by geographic or demographic characteristics, alleviating the problem of sparse subsamples by smoothing the group estimates with a dynamic hierarchical model. The resulting group estimates can then be weighted in proportion to their composition of the population.
31
This approach thus uses information from many question responses spread across many polls to derive estimates of the aggregate distribution of liberalism.
We use the Caughey-Warshaw model to estimate mass-level liberalism in each year between 1936 and 1952. Like the congressional IRT estimates, the mass-level estimates are based only on policy questions related to New Deal liberalism, which still yields over 450 distinct question series. Figure 2 plots the yearly hierarchical coefficient estimates from a model that defines groups by the variables Farm, Phone Owner, Professional, Urban, and the interaction of Southern and Black.
32 As this figure illustrates, New Deal liberalism is negatively associated with indicators of socioeconomic status, with residence in rural agricultural areas, and with being white. Regional patterns are not readily apparent in this graph, but they become clearer when we examine the weighted group estimates.
In our analysis of representation, we rely on estimates of liberalism in two sets of 31. In addition, the group-level question marginals used to estimate the model can also be weighted. This framework's combination of hierarchical smoothing and post-estimation weighting is similar to the multilevel regression and poststratification method described by Gelman and Little (1997) and Park, Gelman, and Bafumi (2004) .
32. Note that these are the structural coefficients from a model predicting group liberalism, not the estimates of mean group liberalism themselves. Within each group, respondents have been weighted to be balanced between men and women, the former being overrepresented in the samples. population groups. 33 The first set of groups is defined by the interaction of the variables South, Black, and Presidential Vote (Democratic, Republican, and Other/Did Not Vote). These estimates are presented in Figure 7 in the Supplementary Appendix. The second set of groups is defined by the interaction of State and Black. We use the State × Black estimates to derive the average liberalism in the electorate of each state. In the non-South, this entails weighting race-specific group estimates according to the racial composition of the states' citizens. In the South, we define the electorate as the white public, dropping Southern blacks from the analysis.
34 Together with the ideal-point estimates discussed earlier, these estimates of mass-level liberalism form the empirical basis for the analysis of representation that follows.
Collective Representation
We begin with an examination of Southern senators' and representatives' collective representation of the Southern white public. 35 In the aggregate, were Southern MCs' roll-call records on economic issues congruent with the expressed preferences of Southern whites? Since the congressional and mass-level estimates of liberalism are not on the same scale, we cannot directly measure their spatial proximity or congruence (Achen 1978; Matsusaka 2001) . 36 We can still learn a great deal, however, 33. For both sets of estimates, we weight the raw survey responses to adjust for class and gender biases in the samples. The population targets for these variables were derived from census and other data using the interpolation method described in Caughey and Wang (2014) .
34. Southern blacks were severely undersampled-or not sampled at all-in the early polls, most of which sought to make their samples representative of voters, not of the American public at large. Although many polls include a question on retrospective presidential vote, we do not use this variable to define the voting population because (1) voting is highly overreported and (2) this definition would preclude us from weighting the model estimates since the demographic characteristics of voters is not known. That said, there appears to have been very little difference in liberalsim between Southern whites who reported having voted for the Democratic presidential candidate and nonvoting Southern whites. However, presidential Republicans, who made up an increasing proportion of the Southern whites after 1948, were substantially more conservative (this contrasts with Shafer and Johnston's claim that Republican vote choice was unrelated to social welfare attitudes in the 1950s; Shafer and Johnston 2006, 28-9) . The conservative impact of rising Republican shares was counterbalanced by the fact that Republicans were less likely to participate in Democratic primaries and by the contemporaneous enfranchisement of a modest number of (more liberal) Southern blacks. In short, the ideological difference between the white public and the Democratic primary electorate were probably minimal, especially in the years 1937-52.
35. The term collective representation is taken from Weissberg (1978) . Our usage differs slightly from his in that he applies it to Congress as an institution, whereas we apply it to a collectivity (Southern Democrats) within that institution.
36. For example, Achen's analysis of House members' proximity to their constituents relies on the assumption that the Guttman issue scales for representatives and citizens have the same scale once by comparing relative positions of different groups of citizens and legislators. Figure 3 compares trends in liberalism among Northern Democrats, Southern Democrats, and Republicans in three venues: the white public, the U.S. House, and the U.S. Senate. 37 Both at the mass level and in Congress, Southern Democrats began the 1937-52 period as enthusiastic New Dealers, almost as much so as Northern Democrats. By the mid-1940s, Southern Democrats in all three venues had moved to a moderate position about halfway between Northern Democrats and Northern Republicans.
38
The similarities across the three venues suggest that Southern MCs were broadly in step with the Southern white public. Moreover, there is little evidence that the Southern whites simply followed the changing views of their congressional representatives (cf. Lenz 2012). Indeed, the Southern white public's shift to the ideological center in 1937-42 clearly preceded the corresponding shift among Southern senators. Thus, while we cannot rule out the possibility that both shifts were driven by some third factor, such as the changing views of the Southern elite, these figures provide suggestive evidence of dynamic representation on the part of Southern MCs (Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995) .
Responsiveness to Economic Policy Preferences
Southern MCs appear to have been broadly in step with the Southern white public, but were they responsive to ideological differences between their electorates? Was responsiveness greater in the non-South, and did it differ between the House and Senate? These questions present something of a hard test for my argument because responsiveness is a hallmark of competition between polarized parties-even to the point of "leapfrog representation" (Bafumi and Herron 2010). In other words, it is possible that Southern MCs were collectively congruent with their electorates without being individually responsive to them. they have been standardized (see Achen 1978, 485) .
37. We define partisanship in terms of retrospective presidential vote since this is the most frequently available indicator. Although blacks could vote in the North, they are excluded for consistency's sake from the mass-level estimates in the North as well as the South. Including Northern blacks in the analysis slightly increases the relative conservatism of Southern white Democrats. The same is true if Southern white Republicans are included in the analysis.
38. Another notable feature of this graph is the partisan convergence in the early war years and renewed polarization after the war. This pattern may be the result of wartime bipartisanship, which temporarily muted partisan divisions over the New Deal. It should also be noted that since partisanship is defined in terms of retrospective presidential vote, the composition of partisan groups changes after each election. The evidence, however, suggests otherwise. Consider Figure 4 , which plots the relationship between the average liberalism of state publics and Senate delegations in the 75th (1937-38) through 82nd (1951-52) congresses. The estimates for Southern publics include only white citizens, which still represents an expansive definition of the Southern electorate.
39 Nevertheless, the relationship between Southern publics and their senators is clearly positive in every congress except the 77th (1941-42), a moment of ideological flux in Southern opinion.
Moreover, there are no obvious differences senatorial responsiveness between the South and non-South. In both Congress and the public, the ideological range across states is smaller in the South than the non-South, but the regression slopes in the two regions are approximately parallel. Indeed, the biggest regional difference is that by 1939-40, Southern senators look anomalously liberal relative to their state publics, who began to cluster at the conservative end of states. The Senate delegation of Louisiana, for example, is nearly a standard deviation more liberal than states with a similarly conservative mass public, such as Iowa or South Dakota.
40 Figure 5 replicates the same analysis but for state delegations to the U.S. House of Representatives. Since public liberalism must be estimated at the state level, the match between House members and their constituencies is not perfect, especially in the South, where congressional districts were highly unequal in population. Still, in most years, Southern states with more liberal white publics tended to have more liberal House delegations. The relationship between public and House liberalism, however, appears to have been stronger and more consistent in the non-South.
Formal statistical analysis confirms these visual patterns. Table 1 presents the results of a model of responsiveness in congresses between 1936 and 1952. 41 The 39. Including blacks in the Southern public barely alters the results, perhaps because there are too few black respondents in the data for precise estimation of black opinion. Including all whites in the "public" is an expansive definition of the Southern potential electorate because most Southern whites did not vote (to a lesser degree, this is also true of the non-South).
40. "The rest of the world," observes Carleton ( model includes separate congress-chamber-region intercepts and a three-way interaction between Non-South, Senate, and Citizen Liberalism, clustering standard errors by state. The analysis has low power because there are just eleven Southern states, but there is robust evidence of responsiveness in the one-party South in both the House (represented by the main effect of Citizen Liberalism) and the Senate (the main effect plus its interaction with Senate).
42
There is also suggestive evidence of differences between the House and Senate. First, Southern senators are estimated to be more responsive than Southern representatives, though the difference is not statistically significant.
43 Second, as indicated by the estimate for Non-South × Citizen Liberalism, responsiveness among House members appears to have been stronger outside the South (p = 0.08). In the Senate, however, there is no evidence that responsiveness differed across regions-in fact, the point estimate for the slope difference between regions is almost exactly 0.
In short, Southern states where the white population was more supportive of New Deal liberalism tended to be represented by more liberal House and Senate delegations. The evidence thus suggests that Southern MCs were not only collectively in line with the Southern white public, but also responsive to within-region differences in white preferences. To the extent that Southern Democrats were out-of-step with their constituents, they appear to have been more liberal than the white public, at least relative to the non-South. We should not make too much of this "liberal bias," which is almost certainly explained by the pull of party loyalty on the South's overwhelmingly Democratic congressional delegation. But it is worth noting that this bias is inconsistent with Key's (1949) claim that the one-party system benefitted the timated liberalism of senators in each state (and do the same for representatives). This yields the variable MC Liberalism. Second, we estimate each state's average liberalism over the course of each congress by averaging the state's estimated mean liberalism across the two years in that congress. This yields the variable Citizen Liberalism. We calculate the standard error of the derived averages under the assumption of independent measurement error across units (this will overestimate measurement error if the errors are positively correlated, as they probably are). The public opinion estimates for the 74th Congress are derived from a handful of polls conducted in the last months of 1936, and as a result the opinion estimates for this congress are fairly imprecise. To account for measurement error in the analysis, we create 100 "overimputed" datasets using the standard errors around the liberalism estimates. We estimate the model on each of the 100 datasets and combine inferences about model parameters using standard multiple-imputation formulas (Blackwell, Honaker, and King 2012; Honaker, King, and Blackwell 2011) .
42. The estimated responsiveness slope for Southern senators is 0.57, with a standard error of 0.29.
43. Strictly speaking, the ideal-point estimates are not comparable across chambers. However, ideal points in both chambers have a roughly standard normal distribution. The standard deviation of the liberalism of state delegations is a bit larger in the House (0.6 versus 0.5 in the Senate). This analysis of responsiveness to mass policy preferences has also revealed suggestive evidence of differences between the House and Senate. Given that public opinion must be measured at the level of states rather than districts, however, it is difficult to know how to interpret heterogeneity across chambers. To further explore this question, we take advantage of data we do have at the district level: the distribution of household income. In addition to permitting a more direct analysis of responsiveness in the House, using income as a proxy for citizens' economic interests helps rule out the possibility that citizens' preferences are derived from the behavior of their representatives rather than the other way around.
Responsiveness to Economic Interests
All else equal, policies that make the distribution of economic resources more equal tend to benefit poorer citizens more than richer ones. Consequently, if income is all that voters care about and politicians respond to the median voter, electorates whose median income is high relative to the average should select representatives who are less supportive of redistributive policies. (Meltzer and Richard 1981; Roemer 1999; Londregan 2006) . The expectations provided by a median-voter model of redistribution thus provide a way to evaluate responsiveness without having to measure citizens' preferences directly.
44
On the whole, the New Deal was strongly redistributive, at least by the standards of American politics. New Deal policies contributed to the decline in economic inequality in the middle of the 20th century, and conflict over these policies helped realign political cleavages along more class-based lines (Oestreicher 1998; Sundquist 1983) . Indeed, Figure 2 indicates that upper-class survey respondents (phone owners and professionals) were in fact less supportive of New Deal liberalism. Since our measure of MC Liberalism is based on the issue complex at the core of the New 44. Many empirical studies have found little cross-sectional correlation between the extent of redistribution and income inequality. See, for example, Lindert (2004) on the "Robin Hood paradox," and Lupu and Pontusson (2011) on the importance of income "skew." There is substantial evidence, however, for the median-voter model's comparative statics. Husted and Kenny (1997) find that the elimination of suffrage restrictions in U.S. states led to higher turnout, a poorer median voter, and higher state spending on social welfare. Fowler (2013) finds similar results in an examination of compulsory voting in Australian provinces. In the study most relevant to the one-party South, Fleck (2002) analyzes voting patterns on the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act, using general-election voter turnout as a proxy for the political influence of low-wage workers. Fleck finds that representatives from congressional districts where electoral turnout in 1932 was higher were more likely to support the FLSA.
Deal, it provides a reasonable indicator of senators' and representatives' support for economic redistribution.
Of course, New Deal liberalism was not simply about class. It also involved the use of federal resources to aid underdeveloped areas of the country and, increasingly, conflict over urban-rural divisions and the autonomy of the South's racial political economy (Garson 1974; Katznelson, Geiger, and Kryder 1993; Schwartz 1993; Badger 2007) .
45 It is thus important to account for ruralness and the intensity commitment to white supremacy in our evaluation of the responsiveness of Southern MCs to the economic interests of their constituents.
There were three basic sources of variation in median income across Southern electorates. Most obviously, some areas of the South, particularly those with whiter and more urban population, were wealthier and more developed. Secondly, constituencies differed in their degree of income equality; a constituency with relatively high per-capita income might still have relatively low median income if income was concentrated at the very top. Thirdly, the size of the electorate relative to the population differed across constituencies. Holding constant the income of the population, the median voter was richer where turnout was lower due to the strong class bias in Southern turnout. Our measure of median income in the electorate must take into account these three sources of variation.
Yearly data on the income distribution in congressional districts is not directly available, and we must use a fairly complicated procedure to estimate it (see Appendix A). In brief, the procedure is to, first, use county-level census data to impute the yearly proportions of households in each year with income below two thresholds: 1.3 × national per-capita income (NPCI) and 3.3 × NPCI.
46 Second, the analogous constituency-level proportions are derived by aggregating counties into congressional districts or states. These proportions pin down the entire income distribution under the apparently reasonable assumption that income was log-normally distributed within constituencies. Finally, the constituency-level income distribution is used to estimate median household income (relative to the nation) in various definitions of the electorate. Since we have collected data on the county composition of congressional districts in the South only, we confine our analysis to Southern states.
In 1930, the South was substantially poorer than the rest of the nation; the median household income in the typical congressional district was around 1.2 NPCI. 46. It is appropriate to normalize income by the national average because we are examining congressional representation, and thus the community within which income may be redistributed is the nation, not the constituency.
47. Unless income is very unequally distributed, per-capita income will be lower than median
By 1960 some areas, such as Dallas, Texas and Arlington, Virginia, had converged with the rest of the nation, achieving median household incomes of over 2 NPCI.
48
Most of the South, however, became only a little more prosperous relative to the nation during these years. Throughout this period, the poorest areas of the South tended to be rural and often highly African American-districts like Mississippi's 3rd, a black-belt district where the median household income was 0.7 NPCI in 1940.
49
The districts with the poorest electorates, however, were rural white districts such as Arkansas's 2nd, where the population was poor but largely enfranchised.
50
We consider four alternative definitions of the (potential) electorate in Southern constituencies. The most restrictive definition is the set of voters who participated in the most recent Democratic congressional primary in the state or district. This requires dropping uncontested primaries from the analysis. A slightly broader definition is the set of voters who participated in the most recent presidential general election. A still more expansive definition of the electorate is the white public. Finally, the maximal definition includes all residents of a state or district. Although none of these definitions is perfect, the best is probably the white population, which is less endogenous than the active electorate but captures the potential electorate more accurately than the total population.
51
We estimate the electorate's median relative income in constituency d and election year t using the formula
where e dt is the size of the electorate as a proportion of the voting-age population, andμ log dt andσ log dt are, respectively, the estimated mean and standard deviation of log relative income (assumed normally distributed).
52 To evaluate responsiveness to household income because its denominator is the total number of residents, which is greater than the number of households. 48. Arlington's congressional district, VA-10, was captured by the Republican Party as soon as it was created in 1952.
49. As it happens, MS-3 was represented in the 1950s by Frank Smith, who was actually quite liberal on economic issues and moderate (for Mississippi) on racial ones (Badger 2007).
50. AR-2 was represented by Wilbur Mills, longtime chair of Ways and Means and architect of Medicare and Medicaid (Zelizer 1998).
51. Among other things, primary turnout is directly influenced by the quality of congressional representation, not least because it can be measured only when primaries are contested. Presidential turnout avoids this problem but is affected by the competitiveness of presidential elections, which in this era was correlated with a higher Republican share (and thus a more conservative electorate).
52. This formula also assumes that every member of the electorate (however defined) has higher median voter income, we estimate several models of the following general form: The combination of four definitions of the electorate (Primary Voters, Presidential Voters, All Whites, and All Citizens) and four model specifications (Year FEs, Linear, Splines, and State FEs) yields sixteen sets of results. Figure 6 presents the estimated responsiveness of Southern senators (β 1 + β 2 ) and House members (β 1 ) as well as the difference between chambers (β 2 ). The standard errors for all of these coefficients are clustered by member of Congress.
54 To account for uncertainty in the income imputation, 10 multiply imputed datasets were created and inferences combined across them.
Qualitatively, all the specifications tell a similar story. Income generally predicts congressional conservatism in both chambers, with the slope estimates smaller but income than every non-voter. Notwithstanding the strong class bias in Southern turnout, this assumption is unlikely to hold perfectly. However, unless the class bias in turnout (conditional on the overall level of turnout) varies across constituencies, differences in m dt will be monotonically related to differences in true median voter income.
53. Splines permit flexible non-linear specifications that economize on degrees of freedom (Harrell 2001, 20-4) .
54. More specifically, the clusters consists of each unique combination of members representing a given constituency at the same time. For example, each pair of senators who represented the same state at the same time is assigned a unique ID. more precise for primary and presidential voters. 55 The magnitude of the point estimates ranges between 0.01 and 0.56. Substantively, the largest estimates imply that the decrease in MC Liberalism associated with a 1-NPCI increase in voters' median household income is approximately equal to the standard deviation of MC Liberalism within the Southern caucus.
56
Though the slope differences between chambers are not not always significant, responsiveness again appears to have been stronger in the Senate than the House.
57
This impression is reinforced by the fact that in the specification with state fixed effects (bottom row), which account for persistent differences between states, the House coefficient is reduced to insignificance in all cases. Only when we consider the presidential electorate is responsiveness approximately equal across chambers.
55. The greater variability of the estimates for whites and citizens maybe due to the "sluggishness" of these variables and their collinearity with demographic controls.
56. MC Liberalism has approximately unit-variance in each chamber. Among Southern Democrats, its standard deviation was 0.56 in the House and 0.42 in the Senate.
57. This is probably not a consequence of different ideal-point scales across chambers, since MC Liberalism is actually more variable in the House than the in Senate (where it is usually averaged across two senators).
Conclusion
In this paper, I have presented a view of Southern politics quite at odds with the conventional wisdom. In essence, I have argued that MCs from the one-party South can be analyzed using the same framework that political scientists use to explain congressional politics more generally. Like politicians elsewhere in the country, the behavior of Southern MCs is largely, though by no means exclusively, attributable to their electoral incentives (Mayhew 1974a; cf. Fenno 1973) . Moreover, the potential electorate was inclusive enough that Southern MCs responded not only to elite preferences, but to the preferences of middle-and low-income whites as well.
My thesis would seem to be at odds with the increasingly common practice of labeling the one-party South an "authoritarian regime" (Farhang and Katznelson 2005; Gibson 2012; Mickey 2014) . This is true insofar as authoritarianism is considered to preclude formal opportunities for popular participation and political contestation.
58
However, if authoritarianism is conceptualized as encompassing a wide variety of regimes that fall short of democratic standards, then my argument is perfectly compatible with a view of the one-party South as an authoritarian regime. Without a doubt, Southern states fell far short of democratic standards, most importantly in their exclusion of African Americans from political citizenship.
Yet an important premise of my argument is that the political exclusion of Southern blacks was qualitatively different from suffrage limitations on whites. Though pruning "unworthy" whites from the electorate was certainly a goal of many turnof-the-century disenfranchisers-as it was for contemporaneous proponents of literacy tests and other suffrage qualifications in the North-this goal was never fully achieved, in part due to the appeal of a countervailing ideology of "herrenvolk democracy" for whites. Put simply, even poor whites were considered part of the political community in a way that blacks were not.
59 Thus, notwithstanding the very real barriers to lower-class political participation, with respect to whites the one-party South lay somewhere on the continuum between autocracy and democracy (and exhibited substantial internal variation on this continuum).
Distinguishing the effects of political exclusion from those of restricted competition is essential to understanding the implications of the one-party South for democratic theory. As the evidence in this paper indicates, lack of partisan competition does not seem to have prevented Southern MCs from responding to the preferences of 58. Mickey (2014) carefully avoids such a definition. Indeed, disagreement and contestation within the one-party system are central to his account of the South's "transition to democracy." 59. Even politicians who sought black votes could not afford to do so publicly, and so rather did so through emissaries to the black community.
the eligible electorate.
60 In fact, contrary to the conventional conclusion that lack of party competition biased representation in favor of the "haves," Southern MCs were actually more liberal than one would expect given the economic policy preferences of their constituents.
Despite the strength of the evidence for responsiveness, the case for representation without parties must be carefully qualified. Southern MCs did not face regular partisan competition, but neither did they act in a totally party-less environment. Indeed, the fact that congressional roll-call voting was highly structured by partisanship compensated for some of the limitations of completely nonpartisan politics. Southern MCs could not avoid taking clear stances on high-profile, ideologically defined decisions, for which they could (with the aid of challengers) be held accountable by the electorate. By contrast, state politics in the South, the focus of Key's brief against one-partyism, was more insulated from the effects of the national two-party system.
On a final note, let us consider the implications of these findings for our understanding of American political development. As Ira Katznelson has argued most forcefully, Southern MCs pivotal position in national politics gave them outsized role in shaping the welfare state and political economy of the United States (Katznelson 2005 (Katznelson , 2013 see also Quadagno 1994; Lieberman 1998; Brown 1999; Alston and Ferrie 1999) . By and large, these accounts have treated Southern MCs as representing the Southern elite. They attribute Southern Democrats' turn against organized labor in the 1930s and 1940s, for example, to planters and other Southern employers' concern that unions threatened the region's racial system and labor-repressive political economy (Katznelson, Geiger, and Kryder 1993; Farhang and Katznelson 2005) . As Schickler and Caughey (2011) observe, however, this explanation ignores the potential impact of the contemporaneous anti-labor turn of public opinion in the South (as well as in the non-South).
My findings in this paper suggest that a fuller account of Southern MCs' role 60. This study has not considered representation on civil rights issues, on which Southern whites were much less divided and were much more clearly national outliers than on economic issues. But the basic argument applies at least as strongly in this domain. Dahl (1971, 93-4) rightly notes that "southern whites were overwhelmingly allegiant" to the South's system of racial oppression. In a 1942 poll, for example, only 2% of Southern whites reported supporting racially integrated schools, compared to 42% of non-Southern whites (Schuman et al. 1997, 109) . White opposition to civil rights was so overwhelming that Southern MCs almost never deviated from white supremacist orthodoxy (though see Werner 2009). Thus, Miller and Stokes (1963, 55) observe, "the electorate's sanctions" on civil rights issues were "potential rather than actual. . . . Nevertheless, the fact of constituency influence, backed by potential sanctions at the polls, [was] real enough." They cite as an example Dale Alford's write-in primary victory over Rep. Brooks Hays (D-AR) after the latter tried to help defuse the 1956 crisis over school integration in Little Rock.
in American political development must be rooted in their electoral incentives and, in turn, in the political preferences and behavior of the white public. From this perspective, the reason that Southern MCs were pivotal in Congress was that the Southern white public was torn between the benefits and dangers of New Deal liberalism. Such a framework still leaves ample room for economic elites in the one-party South to have exercised disproportionate influence, as indeed they appear to exercise in the contemporary United States (Bartels 2008; Gilens and Page, forthcoming). But by reducing the distance between between the "authoritarian" South and the "democratic" non-South, it enhances our understanding of both. 
A Estimation and Imputation of Income
The analysis of Southern MCs' responsiveness to the economic interests of their electorates relies on several proxies for the median income in the electorate. This section describes how these proxies were estimated and multiply imputed. Like all demographic characteristics of congressional districts in the dataset for the paper, districts' estimated income distribution must be derived from data at the county level. Before 1962, all but a handful of Southern congressional districts were composed of whole counties.
61 Based on information contained in Martis et al. (1982) , I assigned each county in the 17-state South to its House district in each congressional election 1930-62. Using this mapping, it is possible to calculate the district-level value of any quantity that is a function of data available at the county level. For example, to calculate the proportion of district residents who are white, I take the weighted average of the proportion white in the counties that composed the district, where the weights are given by the number of residents of each county.
The calculation of the districts' income distribution is not so straightforward, for several reasons. First, county-level income data are not available before 1950, when the U.S. Census began collecting county-level data on median household income (which is missing for some counties) as well as on the proportions of households with yearly income below $2,000 and $5,000. Second, estimating the income of the median voter requires the whole income distribution, not just a single statistic such as the mean. We deal with these problems with a combination of multiple imputation and assumptions about the shape of the income distribution.
Let's start with 1950, when income data are observed. We can derive each district's proportions of household with income below $2,000 and $5,000 by taking a weighted average of the corresponding quantities for counties in that district.
62 Since we ultimately care not about absolute income but income relative to the national average, it is helpful to divide $2,000 and $5,000 by nation per capita income in 1950, which was $1,516.
63 Let p 62. Strictly speaking the counties should be weighted by their number of households, but I instead use number of residents, which is almost exactly proportional to the number of households.
63. We divide by per capita national income rather than per household because only the former is available in every year.
as well as how unequal it is.
The distribution of income is usually considered to be log-normal (i.e., the natural log of income is normally distributed), a regularity known as "Gibrat's law."Assuming Gibrat's law held within Southern congressional districts, p ,1950 are sufficient to pin down the entire income distribution.
64 Specifically, the mean of (normally distributed) log relative income in district d is
and its standard deviation is
where Φ indicates the standard normal CDF. Givenμ 1950 and the assumption that log relative income is normally distributed within districts, we can derive the median income in any subset of the income distribution. To estimate the median log income the electorate, we must assume that everyone in the electorate has a higher income than everyone outside the electorate-i.e., the class bias is extreme as possible, given the size of the electorate. Under this assumption, the median log income (=log median income) in the electorate is • Population
• Proportion Urban
• Proportion White 64. Battistin, Blundell, and Lewbel (2009) provide evidence that Gibrat's law is approximately true in the United States, and almost exactly so for the top 75% of the income distribution.
• State Per Capita Income
• Proportion Enrolled in School (among 14-17 year olds)
Since we wish to predict relative income, these variables must be demeaned within years so as to eliminate over-time changes common to all units.
The imputation model specification (with demeaned variables marked with an asterisk),
explains 69% of the variance of p ct for noncensus years were linearly interpolated from the census estimates. The estimates for each year and each imputed dataset were used to calculate the district-level income distribution using the same method described above. This yielded ten imputed district-level datasets with estimates of µ log dt , σ log dt , and m dt .
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